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Abstract 
Since its inception in 2006, the United Nations-backed Principles for Responsible Investment 
(PRI) have grown to over 1300 signatories representing over $45 trillion. This growth is not 
slowing down. In this paper, we argue that there is a set of attributes which make the PRI salient 
as a stakeholder and its claim to sign the six PRI important to institutional investors. We use 
Mitchell et al.’s (Acad Manag Rev 22:853–886, 1997) theoretical framework of stakeholder 
salience, as extended by Gifford (J Bus Eth 92:79–97, 2010). We use as evidence confidential 
data from the annual survey of signatories carried out by the PRI in a 5-year period between 
2007 and 2011. The findings highlight pragmatic and organizational legitimacy, normative and 
utilitarian power, and management values as the attributes that contribute most to the salience 
of the PRI as a stakeholder. 
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Introduction 
As recurring financial crises and financial market instability are prompting a reconsideration 
of how we invest (Woods and Urwin 2010), there is increased interest from academics and 
practitioners in responsible investment strategies. Socially responsible investment (SRI) 
includes environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors in investment decision making. 
If responsible investment is part of the answer to the troubles of the financial system, it is 
important to know what causes investors to take this strategy on board. Institutional investors 
as a group of financial actors with distinct motivations (Jansson and Biel 2011) and barriers 
(Guyatt 2006) to adopting ESG are worthy of scrutiny. They control the majority of total 
shareholdings −84 % in the UK (Mallin 2007)—and in most countries account for the 
overwhelming majority of SRI assets (Jansson and Biel 2011). A wide adoption of ESG by 
institutional investors would mean real momentum behind the ESG movement (Sandberg 
2011). 
The United Nations-backed Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) is a global 
organization that advances responsible investment with over 1300 signatories representing over 
$45 trillion (as of Dec. 2014). Because of its size, prominence, and first-mover status, the PRI 
is likely the most important global responsible investment initiative in existence today 
(Sandberg 2013; Woods and Urwin 2010). The combined impact of the PRI’s activity has 
firmly put responsible investment on the map (Sievanen et al. 2013). As Sophia Grene wrote 
in the Financial Times in 2009: “That sustainability is no longer a niche concept, sitting in the 
corner with the church groups and green evangelists, can be demonstrated by figures from the 
UN PRI.” 
Why have over 1300 institutional investors decided over the last 9 years to sign the PRI? Why 
dedicate resources that would otherwise be used to satisfy other stakeholders’ claims, to the 
annual reporting, signatory fees and implementing the six PRI principles? To analyze this 
question, we use the framework of institutional theory which unpacks the way institutions 
respond to external pressures beyond their internal mandate (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; 
Dorado 2005; Greenwood and Hinings 1996; Greenwood et al. 2011; Lounsbury 2007). We 
will explore the stakeholder relationship between the PRI and investors to find out what makes 
the PRI’s claim salient to these investors. For that purpose, we use a set of attributes first 
identified by Mitchell et al. (1997) and then expanded by Gifford (2010) as to what makes 
stakeholders and their claims salient to organizations. 
While there has been much speculation, there are currently no other empirical studies as to why 
investors have chosen to sign these principles. It is the motivation of this paper to shed some 
light on that question, using an important confidential dataset obtained directly from the PRI 
drawn from annual surveys over a 5-year period (2007–2011) of their signatories. This 
confidential dataset has been provided to us exclusively for the purpose of this study Fig. 1. 
Fig. 1 
Growth of the collective AUM of PRI signatories. Source http://www.unpri.org Accessed 23 
June 2014 
To tackle the question why institutional investors sign the PRI, we have to think of the 
investment firm as an organization that has stakeholders with competing claims. This is a new 
way to look at investors, as the academic literature to date, usually describes them as 
stakeholder’s of the firm (Brower and Mahajan 2013; Verbeke and Tung 2013). The PRI with 
its objective of pushing SRI into the mainstream via its signatory body is affected by the 
institutional investor’s adoption or rejection of the principles, making the PRI a stakeholder to 
investors according to Freeman’s (1984) definition of stakeholder. Observing the principles 
and the commitment to them is the claim that the PRI makes of all institutional investors. 
Therefore, signing the PRI for the purpose of this paper counts as prioritizing a stakeholder’s 
claim based on its salience. Competing stakeholder claims would be e.g., the clients’ or 
beneficiaries’ lack of expressed interest in RI, competing reporting frameworks that would 
claim the resources otherwise dedicated to the PRI annual reporting and implementation of the 
principles, or the investment team’s entrenchment in their existing mainstream investment 
approach. 
We code 5 years of signatories’ responses to the question of why they signed the principles and 
what they perceive to be the benefits of signing, in search of evidence of the attributes of power, 
legitimacy, urgency, management values, coalition building, and relative economic size 
(Gifford 2010; Mitchell et al. 1997) contributing to the salience of the PRI’s claim in the eyes 
of investors. 
The paper will first introduce the conceptual background, exploring existing literature on 
institutional theory and stakeholder relationships in the context of responsible investment. 
Next, the theoretical framework and its application will be detailed. In the following parts, we 
describe the dataset and methodology. The final parts of the paper present and discuss the 
findings. The paper closes with research limitations and conclusions. 
Conceptual Background 
The PRI is a global investor association founded in 2005 with the backing of the United Nations 
and the objective of promoting the six PRI and helping institutional investors who sign to 
implement them. Institutional investors are defined as organizations that manage and invest on 
behalf of clients and beneficiaries. This includes pension funds, banks, asset managers, and 
insurers among other types of organizations (Sandberg 2011). Devised by the investment 
community itself, the principles form a framework for incorporating ESG issues into 
investment decision making. They are based on the conviction that ESG factors have an impact 
on the performance of investments (Table 1).  
Table 1 
The six principles for responsible investment 
(1) We will incorporate ESG issues into investment analysis and decision-making processes 
(2) We will be active owners and incorporate ESG issues into our ownership policies and 
practices 
(3) We will seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the entities in which we invest 
(4) We will promote acceptance and implementation of the Principles within the investment 
industry 
(5) We will work together to enhance our effectiveness in implementing the Principles 
(6) We will each report on our activities and progress toward implementing the Principles 
The PRI’s voluntary and aspirational nature means that there is a large heterogeneity of ESG 
advancement among its one thousand-odd signatories. Therefore, being a signatory to the 
principles is not necessarily synonymous with being a responsible investor. However, the mere 
act of signing the principles remains worthy of scrutiny, as, in the words of PRI founder James 
Gifford: “The important thing is to get people in the tent, for whatever reason. Then once they 
are in, you can start to inspire change.” (Gifford 2014, pers. comm., 15 June) This mechanism 
of gradual decrease with time in the gap between declared policy and practice is documented 
in academic literature on decoupling (Boxenbaum and Jonsson 2008; Bromley and Powell 
2012; Edelman 1992; Hallett 2010; Sauder and Espeland 2009; Scott 2008; Tilcsik 2010), most 
relevantly in Haack et al.’s (2012) study on the adoption of the Equator Principles that finds 
decoupling to be a transitory phenomenon. The PRI is not an isolated phenomenon in the 
contemporary institutional landscape. In the area of responsible investment regional, Social 
Investment Forums (SIFs) and the United Nations Environmental Program Finance Initiative 
(UNEP FI) are also important organizations. 
Institutional theory has made many valid attempts to systematize the way we look at industry 
initiatives of similar nature (Dumas and Louche 2011; Gond et al. 2011). Especially the 
literature on private regulation and multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) has contributed 
significantly to this effort (Bartley 2007; Hardenbrook 2007; Mena and Palazzo 2012). It is 
worth highlighting that the PRI differs from the organizations studied by the MSI literature in 
that it does not have regulatory characteristics per se as the six Principles in and of themselves 
are not overly prescriptive. 
However, despite their differences in perspective, institutional theory, and stakeholder theory 
overlap significantly and share a common interest: explaining how organizations ensure 
survival and growth (Chen and Roberts 2010). External pressures explored in institutional 
theory and questions of power, legitimacy, and other sources of influence (Markowitz et al. 
2008) are also incorporated into the study of stakeholder relationships. In contrast to 
institutional theory, stakeholder theory with its focus on the firm emerged in opposition to the 
shareholder view of the firm, according to which the only relevant stakeholder of the firm is 
the shareholder. Stakeholder theory argues that the tension or alignment between the interests 
of managers and shareholders is not the only relationship that is relevant to a corporation 
(Freeman 1984; Donaldson and Preston 1995). From there, stakeholder theory developed and 
established itself throughout the 1990s with contributions from Goodpaster (1991), Clarkson 
(1994, 1995), Donaldson and Preston (1995), Rowley (1997), and Frooman (1999) being 
among the most prominent ones. Because of its firm-level unit of analysis, it has been used in 
studies in the field of responsible investment to examine stakeholder relationships between 
actors, for instance NGOs and the investment community (Guay et al. 2004). 
Kaler (2006) names one of the functions of stakeholder theory in the field of business ethics as 
being a tool for understanding CSR. One of the characteristics that make it suitable for that 
application is that it is managerial (Donaldson and Preston 1995) in the sense that it is useful 
in directing managers toward the serving of particular interests. For as long as the interests 
served by organizations, the financial interests of shareholders and owners were primarily 
explaining that status quo did not present a challenge. However, in an increasingly mobilized 
society (Power 1997; Strathern 2000) where NGOs, employees, suppliers, and governments 
are more active in presenting their claims of organizations, how do managers decide which of 
those claims are worthwhile in terms of dedicating limited resources of time, labor, and capital 
to them? While in the past investors were seen as a stakeholder, this paper argues that investors 
themselves are increasingly the object of other stakeholder claims. How do they choose 
between these competing demands? Here the notion of stakeholder salience theory becomes 
useful. And it is a variation of that same question that this paper addresses: why do institutional 
investors choose to satisfy the claim of signing the PRI among many other stakeholder claims 
addressed at them? 
In this paper, we choose to apply Mitchell et al.’s (1997) stakeholder salience model, following 
Gifford (2010), as one of the most influential frameworks in the literature (Mainardes et al. 
2012). There are important advantages to Mitchell et al.’s model that explain its widespread 
adoption. It is political, acknowledging the organization’s position at the intersection of 
conflicting and unequal interests. It is practical and easily operationalized, offering versatile 
and relevant categories applicable to varied stakeholder relationships (Tashman and Raelin 
2013). It is also dynamic, recognizing that stakeholder relationships are transient and although 
not exploring that aspect of the relationships extensively, it leaves space for its inclusion 
(Friedman and Miles 2002; Myllykangas et al. 2010; Mainardes et al. 2012). 
Mitchell et al.’s model has been applied extensively to examine an organization’s relationship 
with different stakeholders (Harvey and Schaefer 2001; Parent and Deephouse 2007; 
Mainardes et al. 2012; Brower and Mahajan 2013; Chang et al. 2014), but it has rarely been 
applied empirically to focus in detail on a particular stakeholder relationship, which this paper 
undertakes. 
This framework has also been further developed by Gifford (2010) specifically in the context 
of responsible investment, making the extended version a highly adequate tool for addressing 
the particular stakeholder relationship in question. Mitchell’s et al. stakeholder salience model 
and Gifford’s additions to it are described in more detail in the next section of the paper. 
Theoretical Framework 
Mitchell et al.’s stakeholder salience model is a tool both for the identification and the 
prioritization of stakeholders and their claims (Neville et al. 2011). In this paper, the underlying 
assumption is that the PRI is a stakeholder from the perspective of investors, with its mission 
of ‘understanding the implications of sustainability for investors and supporting signatories to 
incorporate these issues into their investment decision making and ownership practices’ (PRI 
website 2014). The PRI’s stakeholder claim that management prioritizes over others or not is 
that an investment institution should sign the principles. 
As stated in the introduction, it is more common for the investor to be considered as a 
stakeholder from the perspective of the firm (Kaler 2003). While this is the natural approach 
in questions relating to corporate strategy, when discussing investment, stakeholder 
relationships from the investor’s perspective become relevant. From the investor’s perspective, 
it is the PRI that is a stakeholder (Freeman 1984). Either its claim is salient to investors and 
they become a signatory or it is not and they do not sign, following Eesley and Lenox’s (2006) 
action-based definition of salience. Taking this approach contributes to the work within 
stakeholder theory that has been undertaken to expand our views of stakeholders and 
stakeholder relationships (Crane and Ruebottom 2011; Rowley 1997). It also follows the lead 
of scholars who have applied stakeholder theory to different types of institutions, for instance 
Knox and Gruar (2007) who take the perspective of a non-profit organization and examine 
stakeholder relationships from its perspective. A more recent example is a paper by Sobczak 
and Harvard (2015) discussing the influence of NGOs, government, members, and other 
stakeholders on labor unions. The theoretical framework is applied to identify to what degree 
the PRI’s stakeholder claim possesses the salience-producing attributes as predicted by 
Mitchell et al. These attributes are power, legitimacy and urgency. 
Mitchell and his co-authors adopt Etzioni’s (1964) typology of power. Power concerns the 
coercive, utilitarian, or normative means that a stakeholder has at their disposal to exert 
influence on management. Coercive power relates to the use of force, restraint, or violence to 
achieve the actor’s desired outcome despite resistance (Weber 1947). Utilitarian power is based 
on material resources e.g., shareholders exercise utilitarian power by means of financial reward 
or punishment i.e., investment or divestment. Using normative power is linked to symbolic 
resources, such as media attention or reputation. 
Legitimacy and urgency apply to how the claim itself is viewed by the management. 
Legitimacy is ‘a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, 
proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions’ (Mitchell et al. 1997). Mitchell et al. divide it into individual, organizational, and 
societal legitimacy where the degree of legitimacy is tied to the perception of an individual, the 
whole organization, or society’s expressed endorsement of the claim as legitimate. 
Gifford (2010) introduces another moderating factor, which is pragmatic legitimacy. It refers 
to the business case perspective on the stakeholder’s claim. It is determined by the strength of 
the arguments presented by the stakeholder, and the amount of new information they present 
to the management. 
The final factor presented by Mitchell et al. is urgency. It refers to the degree to which the 
claim is perceived by management as calling for immediate attention. According to Agle et al. 
(1999), urgency can be a crucial factor in achieving maximum salience. Urgency has two 
sources: time sensitivity and criticality, time sensitivity coming from time pressure and 
criticality the importance attached to the claim by the stakeholder. For example, in Gifford 
(2010) stakeholders signal criticality by being persistent, assertive and by dedicating significant 
resources to advancing their claim. 
Gifford (2010) expands Mitchell’s et al. model, based on its application to a shareholder-
company relationship in an engagement context. Besides the additions already mentioned, he 
expands the framework with four moderating factors of pragmatic legitimacy, management 
values, the relative economic size of the stakeholder, and coalition building. Gifford also adds 
a temporal dimension to the relative importance of these factors, in that different sources of 
salience are added to the equation during the interaction with the stakeholder, rendering the 
model even less static. This is also the way institutional theory has evolved from its early static 
view of institutions to more dynamic models that take into account the existence of competing 
logics (Meyer and Hollerer 2014). 
Pragmatic legitimacy is the perceived legitimacy of the stakeholder claim as well as the value 
and relevance of the new information that the claim brings to the attention of managers that 
they would not otherwise have considered. 
Management values are defined as the degree of overlap between the values expressed through 
the stakeholder claim and the values of managers. It can moderate salience independently of 
the attributes proposed by Mitchell et al. (1997). 
The size of the stakeholder relative to the company contributes to salience through the 
increased power and legitimacy that stem from it. For example, a larger shareholder is likely 
to hold a more significant stake in a smaller company and have more access to governance 
power as a result. Likewise, they are likely to be a more legitimate and important actor on the 
market. 
The final moderating factor-coalition-building refers to the pooling of resources by 
stakeholders. A stakeholder coalition has the combined size, resources, legitimacy, etc. of its 
participants (e.g., coalitions of shareholders, policy makers, or NGOs). It is therefore a 
moderating factor of power, legitimacy, and urgency. 
Applied Framework 
The application of stakeholder salience theory to the research question ‘Why do investors sign 
the PRI?’ is complicated by the fact that for the purpose of this research, there is no single 
stakeholder whose claim’s salience has specific attributes from the Mitchell and Gifford 
frameworks. Therefore, the analysis focuses on the salience of the claim rather than a particular 
stakeholder. The claim to sign the PRI presented to the investor can and is advanced by the PRI 
itself, but in many cases, it is also advanced by other stakeholders e.g., the trustees, an NGO, a 
senior manager, and it is in that context that it possesses some of the attributes that contribute 
to its salience. Freeman (1984) specified that perceived salience can result from the attributes 
of both a claim and a stakeholder group, as Eesley and Lenox (2006) confirm empirically in a 
study of stakeholder action on environmental issues. In the case discussed in this paper, 
therefore, the subject is the claim to sign the PRI but its salience may be attached to different 
stakeholders. Eesley and Lennox (2006) test the legitimacy and urgency attributes as applied 
to stakeholder claims in a data driven paper and obtain positive results. However, academic 
literature has generally focused on the salience of stakeholders rather than their claims. One of 
the contributions of this paper is to further explore the perceived salience of a stakeholder claim 
through empirical research. 
Below we address each attribute from the Mitchell et al.’s (1997) and Gifford’s (2010) 
framework, and explain how it is applicable to the PRI-investor relationship. Each of these 
attributes is a potential source of salience of the claim to sign the PRI and in coding our dataset 
we look for evidence that backs this intuition. 
As a voluntary and aspirational framework the PRI itself does not use the means of threat or 
coercion to influence an investor’s decision to sign. Coercive power as a means of increasing 
the salience of the claim to sign the PRI would have to come from other sources such as 
regulatory bodies or trustees. A utilitarian, financial incentive is most likely to come from an 
investor’s clients. The desire to attract new clients or to satisfy the demand from existing ones 
by signing the PRI would be examples of utilitarian power as a source of salience. The 
reputational benefits and the signaling of an ESG capability involved in becoming a PRI 
signatory are examples of normative power, as non-material, symbolic incentives to sign the 
PRI. 
Urgency, as the degree to which a stakeholder’s claim calls for immediate attention (time 
sensitivity), has its source in the increasing visibility of the PRI in the investment space and 
the pressure on investors to join the growing trend of responsible investment. The critical aspect 
can be found in the persistence of stakeholders asking investors to sign the PRI, and the amount 
of resources they dedicate to advancing their claim. Legitimacy in an investor-PRI interaction 
can stem from the legitimacy of the PRI as an organization (organizational legitimacy), of an 
individual (individual legitimacy) or from the perceived endorsement of the principles by 
society (societal legitimacy). 
Gifford adds to the above the relative economic size of the stakeholder, which in this context 
becomes the size of the PRI and the growing weight of the AUM of the existing signatories; 
coalition building, i.e., stakeholders building coalitions to advance the claim of signing the PRI 
more effectively, for example, the PRI securing the endorsement of the UN; management 
values which in the case of some investors may already be aligned with those represented by 
the Principles before signing; and pragmatic legitimacy in the form of a perceived business 
case behind the stakeholder claim, in this case the materiality of ESG issues in investment. 
The temporal dimension of the model highlighted by Gifford is observed both in the importance 
of different attributes in each year of the sample and in the importance of different attributes 
over time to signatories who joined in each of the sample years. But empirical evidence is 
needed to deepen our understanding. 
Data and Method 
The data for this study is sourced from a confidential dataset of annual questionnaires from 
2007 to 2011 on the implementation of the PRI principles. This paper presents an analysis of 
responses from asset owners, asset managers, and insurers. In the first few years of this period 
(2007–2010), the questionnaire was obligatory.1 All responses from signatories who signed 
beginning in 2011 are voluntary. 
The question coded for the purpose of this paper was ‘Why did your organization join the PRI?’ 
or ‘Please describe the benefits you have enjoyed as a result of signing the PRI.’ This question 
was optional and open ended. Table below gives some information on the question throughout 
the survey years and the makeup of the respondents (Table 2). 
Table 2 
This table displays the wording of and number of responses to the survey question analyzed 
versus mandatory questions and the proportion of asset owners and asset managers in the 
respondent group 
  
Number 
of 
responses 
to the 
question 
analyzed 
Number of 
responses 
to the 
obligatory 
questions 
Respondents 
to question 
analyzed as a 
proportion of 
all signatories 
(%) 
Wording of 
the question 
by survey 
year 
% of asset 
managers 
among all 
respondents 
in survey 
year 
% of asset 
owners 
among all 
respondents 
in survey 
year 
2007 97 105 63 
Why did your 
organization 
join the PRI? 
43 57 
Table 2 
This table displays the wording of and number of responses to the survey question analyzed 
versus mandatory questions and the proportion of asset owners and asset managers in the 
respondent group 
  
Number 
of 
responses 
to the 
question 
analyzed 
Number of 
responses 
to the 
obligatory 
questions 
Respondents 
to question 
analyzed as a 
proportion of 
all signatories 
(%) 
Wording of 
the question 
by survey 
year 
% of asset 
managers 
among all 
respondents 
in survey 
year 
% of asset 
owners 
among all 
respondents 
in survey 
year 
2008 154 174 59 
Why did your 
organization 
join the PRI? 
46 54 
2009 245 286 59 
Please 
describe the 
benefits you 
have enjoyed 
as a result of 
signing the 
PRI 
55 45 
2010 375 433 60 
Please 
describe the 
benefits you 
have enjoyed 
as a result of 
signing the 
PRI 
62 38 
2011 464 540 57 
Please 
describe the 
benefits you 
63 37 
Table 2 
This table displays the wording of and number of responses to the survey question analyzed 
versus mandatory questions and the proportion of asset owners and asset managers in the 
respondent group 
  
Number 
of 
responses 
to the 
question 
analyzed 
Number of 
responses 
to the 
obligatory 
questions 
Respondents 
to question 
analyzed as a 
proportion of 
all signatories 
(%) 
Wording of 
the question 
by survey 
year 
% of asset 
managers 
among all 
respondents 
in survey 
year 
% of asset 
owners 
among all 
respondents 
in survey 
year 
have enjoyed 
as a result of 
signing the 
PRI 
The question only corresponds directly to the research question in the years 2008 and 2009. 
The questions from years 2009–2011 are only related, and they approach the decision to sign 
the principles from a backward looking perspective, evaluating the positive results of the 
decision.2  
The number of responses to the relevant question remains at around or slightly below 90 % of 
the total responses to obligatory questions and at around 60 % of the total signatory number 
throughout the sample years. The geographical distribution of the sample is still overweight in 
developed regions, with very similar numbers in the general signatory body. 
The proportion of asset managers versus asset owners among the respondents gradually shifted 
over the years, in the sample analyzed as well as the rest of the signatory body. Among asset 
owners, 60 % of assets were managed internally in 2011. Around half of asset owners are non-
corporate pension funds, followed by the second largest group of corporate pension funds 
accounting for 25 % of respondents in 2011. Among asset managers, mainstream investment 
managers are responsible for 77 % of the responses. They are followed by dedicated SRI 
Managers −12 %, and themed fund managers −9 %. 
Listed equity and fixed income are the two dominant asset classes accounting for 36 and 49 % 
of respondents’ assets in 2011, respectively. The third largest category (13 %) is cash, 
commodities, and other assets. 
The analytic method used in this paper is content analysis. It is defined as a research technique 
used to systematically make inferences about the intentions, attitudes, and values of individuals 
by identifying specified characteristics in textual messages that are assumed to be objective for 
the purpose of the study (Morris 1994). It allows for the systematic, numeric analysis of a large 
amount of text in a manner customized to the research that is being conducted. 
Content analysis has featured regularly in management literature (Bergh 1993; Butterfield et 
al. 1996; Buttner 2001; Davy et al. 1992; Molloy et al. 2011), accounting (Beck et al. 2010; 
Fischer 2010), marketing (Hite et al. 1988; Burnett et al. 1991; Rust and Cooil 1994), and 
business ethics where it has been often applied to analyze large volumes of company produced 
publications relating to their ESG policies and activities (Holder-Webb et al. 2009; Jose and 
Lee 2007; Lefebvre and Singh 1992; Sheth and Babiak 2010; Stray 2008). It is also the 
dominant research method for collecting empirical evidence in the field of social environmental 
accounting (Parker 2005). See Appendix 3 for a more detailed analysis of manual content 
coding. 
Two reasons we chose manual coding over automated coding are specifically related to this 
PRI dataset. First, the data was collected from organizations from over 30 countries. The 
differences in wording between even a handful of countries can be hard to manage in 
computerized coding, so we decided it would not be effective in a study with such broad 
geographical scope to correctly identify the entire variety of phrases for automated coding. 
Second, responsible investment is an emergent field and does not have an established 
vocabulary (Sandberg et al. 2009), which makes discrepancies even more likely to obscure 
results when using automated coding. Based on this, the authors agreed that to obtain the most 
accurate results, we should use manual coding where the categories answers fall into are 
decided on a case by case basis. As observed by George and Louise Spindler (1997), ‘only the 
human observer can be alert to divergences and subtleties that may prove to be more important 
than the data produced by any predetermined categories of observation or any instrument’ (p. 
66–67). To ensure a high degree of reliability of the coding, it has been reviewed and discussed 
by James Gifford, founder and executive director of PRI until 2013, and author of extended 
theoretical framework used in this paper, as well as PRI staff members. 
We use magnitude coding for each observation, following Wolfe et al. (1993) finding that 
counting each occurrence of an item in content analysis equally is a simplification and may 
produce misleading results. Units of text are coded on a scale: 0-no support, 1-weak support, 
2-moderate support, 3-strong support, and 4-very strong support. However, only units coded 
2–4 contribute toward the results presented in the analysis section of this paper to exclude 
instances where the coding might depend more on the coder’s interpretation of the text than its 
explicit message. The coding method applied is also simultaneous, meaning that each unit of 
analysis can be coded as supporting multiple attributes in the theoretical framework (Saldana 
2009). Following Gray et al.’s (1995) recommendation, the unit of analysis used is 
predominantly sentences; however, in cases where responses are poorly structured or 
unnecessarily long, multiple sentences or responses as a whole are an alternative. Morris (1993) 
also observed that coding based on entire units of text results in higher agreement between 
coders and human and computer analyses, which provides justification to depart from sentences 
as units of analysis if they are not singularly significant enough. 
Data Analysis and Discussion 
We use descriptive statistics to demonstrate the importance of each factor and how it changed 
over time. We consider the absolute number of answers in support of an attribute in a given 
year and the number as a proportion of all the responses to the relevant question. We look at 
aggregate results from all signatories, as well as split into asset owners and investment 
managers, and by groups of signatories who signed in each sample year. The percentages in 
Tables 3, 4, and 5 below do not add up to 100 because they are a proportion of all survey 
answers submitted in the given year, and the percentage not mentioned would not have been 
coded in support of any of the attributes. 
Table 3 
Summarizes the aggregate numbers of responses that supported each attribute from the 
framework in each survey year 
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The column names are the signature years. The left column contains absolute numbers and 
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Shows the difference between asset owner (AO) and investment manager (IM) answers for 
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Table 5 
Contains the itemized total number of responses supporting the most relevant attributes by 
signature year of respondent 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Utilitarian power 
 2007 1 0       
Table 5 
Contains the itemized total number of responses supporting the most relevant attributes by 
signature year of respondent 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 2008 6 3 1     
 2009 4 11 6 1   
 2010 6 13 15 17 1 
 2011 7 9 14 21 17 
Normative power 
 2007 2 2       
 2008 6 4 0     
 2009 10 19 7 1   
 2010 12 20 25 12 0 
 2011 18 17 20 31 12 
Management values 
 2007 43 30       
 2008 69 41 10     
 2009 15 11 0 0   
 2010 17 18 10 0 0 
 2011 15 18 18 1 0 
Pragmatic legitimacy 
Table 5 
Contains the itemized total number of responses supporting the most relevant attributes by 
signature year of respondent 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 2007 20 10       
 2008 26 17 3     
 2009 33 35 0 0   
 2010 52 51 60 35 0 
 2011 54 48 65 54 22 
Societal legitimacy 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 2007 2 2       
 2008 5 1 0     
 2009 0 1 0 1   
 2010 2 1 3 0 0 
 2011 3 1 2 3 1 
Organizational legitimacy 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 2007 2 0       
 2008 2 0 0     
 2009 12 17 0 0   
 2010 24 23 19 4 0 
 2011 23 20 18 5 4 
Table 5 
Contains the itemized total number of responses supporting the most relevant attributes by 
signature year of respondent 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
  1 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
  4 % 2 % 1 % 0 % 0 % 
  2 % 4 % 2 % 0 % 0 % 
  2 % 3 % 4 % 5 % 0 % 
  2 % 2 % 3 % 5 % 4 % 
  2 % 2 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
  4 % 3 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
  4 % 8 % 3 % 0 % 0 % 
  3 % 5 % 7 % 3 % 0 % 
  4 % 4 % 4 % 7 % 3 % 
  44 % 31 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
  45 % 27 % 6 % 0 % 0 % 
  6 % 4 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
  5 % 5 % 3 % 0 % 0 % 
  3 % 4 % 4 % 0 % 0 % 
  21 % 10 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
  17 % 11 % 2 % 0 % 0 % 
Table 5 
Contains the itemized total number of responses supporting the most relevant attributes by 
signature year of respondent 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
  13 % 14 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
  14 % 14 % 16 % 9 % 0 % 
  12 % 10 % 14 % 12 % 5 % 
  2 % 2 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
  3 % 1 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
  0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
  1 % 0 % 1 % 0 % 0 % 
  1 % 0 % 0 % 1 % 0 % 
  2 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
  1 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
  5 % 7 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
  6 % 6 % 5 % 1 % 0 % 
  5 % 4 % 4 % 1 % 1 % 
Power 
In considering the claim of signing the PRI, power as a source of salience is closely linked to 
the institutional investors’ relationships with their other stakeholders, such as clients, 
regulators, and society. Coercive power means that a stakeholder has the power to force an 
investor to sign the PRI, as for instance a legislator would. Normative power works through 
symbolic means such as the reputational consequences of rejecting or satisfying a stakeholder 
claim. Utilitarian power is exerted via material incentive, for example, the awarding and 
withdrawing of pension fund mandates. 
Coercive power as a source of salience of the claim to sign the PRI is not documented in the 
data. This was in line with the researchers’ expectations based on the voluntary and aspirational 
nature of the PRI framework (Richardson 2009; Scherer and Palazzo 2010) and the lack of 
formal mechanisms of power active in the PRI-investor relationship such as legislation. 
The strongest evidence emerged for normative power. 217 respondents in 2011 submitted 
answers that the researchers coded as support for the attribute of normative power being a 
source of salience in the decision to sign the PRI. This number grew from 3 % in the first year 
of the sample, to 6 % in 2008, 16 % in 2009, and 18 % in 2010 before reaching 47 %, almost 
half of the sample, in 2011. Normative power started out more prominently in the asset owner 
sample and continued to grow steadily, whereas in the investment manager sample it started 
out weaker but caught up with the asset owners by 2010. This translates to asset owners such 
as pension funds and insurers experiencing the reputational and other symbolic pressures and 
benefits earlier in the sample period, before they became a source of salience in the eyes of 
investment managers, possibly with the former driving the latter. 
Mainstream investment managers and corporate pension funds were more influenced by 
normative power than their SRI and public counterparts. In 2011, 40 % of corporate pension 
funds and 21 % of mainstream investment managers mentioned normative power in their 
responses, compared to 18 % of public pension funds, and 11 % of SRI managers. This would 
suggest that the impact of the PRI stamp on mainstream investment manager, corporate 
pensions image, and reputation is larger, perhaps because they start out with no responsible 
investment image while public pensions and SRI investors are more likely to have 
communicated an investment approach similar to the PRI principles even prior to signing. 
The proportion of responses referring to utilitarian power display a similar growth, although 
slightly smaller, starting at 1 % in 2007 and slowly growing to 9 % in 2009, then eventually 
reaching 32 % in 2011. Utilitarian power found more support among asset manager signatories, 
likely due to the power relationship between asset owners and investment managers where an 
ESG capacity is becoming a consideration in hiring managers. A mainstream Australian 
investment manager says ‘We have been queried and reviewed by asset consultants and clients 
on our ESG activities’ (PRI survey responses 2010). A mainstream UK fund explains: 
‘Becoming a PRI signatory has also enabled us to respond positively to asset owner’s RFIs and 
RFPs (requests for information and requests for proposal respectively) that increasingly ask 
about status regarding the PRI’ (PRI survey responses 2010). Therefore, investment managers 
signing the PRI are responding to the material incentive of gaining new clients or satisfying 
the clients they already work for. 
Asset owners quote the support and interest of their members as incentives, e.g., ‘Supports the 
interests/needs of our membership’ as stated by a Canadian public pension fund (PRI survey 
responses 2010). These answers offer evidence that asset owners are becoming more confident 
about the place of ESG considerations in investment practice within a traditional fiduciary 
framework. 
For added perspective, it is useful to look at the distinction between the proportion of 
mainstream versus SRI investment manager responses and public versus private pension fund 
responses coded in support of utilitarian power: 15 % of all mainstream investment manager 
responses to the questions were coded in support of utilitarian power in 2011, compared to 
11 % of SRI managers. The proportion of mainstream investment manager responses remained 
higher throughout the sample, suggesting that this group is more financially driven than SRI 
managers. 
A parallel pattern is clear among asset owners in 2011 where 20 % of corporate fund responses 
were coded in support of utilitarian power, compared to 12 % of public funds, again likely 
because of the more financially driven character of corporate pensions compared to public 
pensions. 
It is also interesting to see that the growth of support for the power attributes are not as sharp 
among signatories who signed the PRI in the first 2 years as it is among the later years. This 
indicates that these two groups are most driven by different attributes: the earlier signatories 
are less likely to have signed for reputational gains, or to attract new business, than their later 
counterparts who were perhaps looking for those benefits as the PRI accelerated the growth of 
ESG in the industry. This divide between the early and the later signatories is reinforced by the 
difference in their support for management values and pragmatic legitimacy and is consistent 
with Gifford’s (2010) temporal aspect where different attributes have varying importance to 
the stakeholder relationship in time. 
The dominant role of normative and utilitarian power as a factor contributing to ESG related 
behavior by organizations does not come as a surprise considering the degree to which it has 
been present in previous literature on the topic of CSR and SRI adoption. In terms of utilitarian 
power, Mackey et al. (2007) propose a model where ethical activity is beneficial to the 
organization conditional on a favorable supply and demand balance. This angle of analysis is 
seconded by Barnett (2007) and corresponds to investors signing the PRI to meet client 
demand, more pronounced among asset managers, as their asset manager clients are more likely 
to clearly communicate ESG requirements. 
This source of salience is also theorized in the form of relational organizational identity 
orientation in Brickson (2007). Brickson distinguishes between collectivistic, relational, and 
individualistic organizations, each of which responds primarily to values-based, client-related, 
and material incentives, respectively. Investors signing the PRI in response to client 
expectations or in an effort to attract clients would be placed somewhere between relational 
and individualistic orientation, depending on how much it is utilitarian and normative power 
related to client relationship and reputation and how much purely business case-type pragmatic 
legitimacy that drives their behavior (Brickson 2007). 
Normative power being an important attribute raises questions regarding a possible decoupling 
of policy and practice among PRI signatories (Crilly et al. 2012; Weaver et al. 1999). In this 
context, it would mean investors signing the PRI to satisfy stakeholders and for reputational or 
signaling benefits while limited effort is made within the organization to integrate the principles 
into investment practice, a legitimacy-seeking strategy described in detail by Long and Driscoll 
(2008). Based on our data, we cannot conclude if that is the case but it is a possibility that could 
be explored by further research. 
Urgency 
We find no support in the data for urgency as a source of salience. Signatories make no explicit 
reference to the timing aspect of the claim to sign the PRI, or pressure resulting from the 
intensity of resources used by stakeholders in advancing it. This may be explained in part by 
urgency being part of the investor-client relationship where an organization considers joining 
the PRI for a long time and a conversation with a client who communicates that they are 
transitioning toward all-PRI-signatory managers delivers the final push (Gifford 2013, pers. 
comm.). It is likely that such instances would be reported as utilitarian incentive without 
mention of the urgency component. 
Other studies in the area of stakeholder salience have reached conflicting conclusions on 
urgency being a contributing factor (Hautbois et al. 2012; Parent and Deephouse 2007; Neville 
et al. 2011; Weber and Marley 2012), and in this paper, we cannot establish its relevance based 
on the data despite considerable anecdotal evidence in its favor (Gifford 2013, pers.comm.). 
Legitimacy 
Of the legitimacy attributes, individual legitimacy is not documented in the data, as signatories 
do not make reference to individuals having a role in advancing the claim to sign the PRI. 
Individual legitimacy was also among the less salient attributes in Gifford’s (2010) study of 
stakeholder engagement, but it has otherwise not been explored empirically in stakeholder 
theory literature. There is some discussion in the literature based on mainly qualitative evidence 
that individuals can play a catalyzing role in institutional transition in an ESG context (Lewis 
and Juravle 2009; Waddock 2011). 
The presence of organizational legitimacy in the survey responses has grown steadily over the 
sample period. Signatories refer to the legitimacy of the PRI as an organization adding to the 
salience of the claim to sign, and also to the PRI conferring legitimacy on their own 
organization and their SRI efforts of joining a leading initiative in the responsible investment 
space (Long and Driscoll 2008; Perez-Batres et al. 2012). 
For instance, a mainstream European fund says signing the PRI ‘grants credibility to its 
commitment to sustainability and corporate governance principles’ (PRI survey responses 
2011). A Canadian public pension fund quotes to be ‘benefiting from the credibility of the PRI 
in the investment community as well as with companies we engage with’ (PRI survey responses 
2011). 
Societal legitimacy defined as the perception of social support for a claim has had a small but 
constant presence in signatory responses. Investors see signing the PRI as a step toward 
aligning their goals with the goals of society, or being better attuned to society. It is difficult to 
hypothesize about why societal legitimacy was not an important factor to investors—other than 
investors feeling little pressure from the side of society as most ESG social pressure is focused 
on corporates. As observed by Baron (2009) who discusses societal pressures on organizations 
to engage is CSR, society is not explicit in manifesting its preferences and may therefore be 
difficult to quote as a source of salience. Support for societal legitimacy was slightly more 
pronounced among public pension funds and SRI managers than mainstream investment 
managers and corporate pensions—at an around 5 % and 1 % mean, respectively—again 
consistent with the generally more socially oriented character of the former (Blackburn 2006; 
Sethi 2005; Sievanen et al. 2013). 
Extended Theoretical Framework 
Of the Gifford additions to the stakeholder salience model are relative economic size and 
coalition building, but these attributes were not supported significantly by the data in this study 
population. Relative economic size in the form that Gifford introduces it to the model is 
reminiscent of institutional isomorphism in institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), 
where the PRI as a growing trend in the industry would encourage larger and larger numbers 
of investors to sign. This may well be the case although it is not recognized by investors as a 
contributing factor to their decision to sign, or not reported as such. The relative size of assets 
is only reported as a significant factor in the context of coalition building opportunities for 
signatories among themselves via the clearinghouse. That is also the context in which coalition 
building is mentioned overwhelmingly by signatories, and also in literature, for instance as 
collectivistic organizational identity orientation in Brickson (2007) or membership of industry 
associations as a moderating factor of social responsibility of organizations in Campbell 
(2007). Neither coalition building nor relative economic size as defined in Gifford’s extended 
model play a role in adding salience to the claim of signing the PRI itself. 
Pragmatic Legitimacy 
Pragmatic legitimacy in the sense of a business case or supplying management with new and 
relevant information is found in a growing number of responses over the sample period. At the 
end of the sample period, almost 50 % of investment manager signatories referred to the PRI 
as supplying relevant ESG integration methods and information, up to 20 percentage points 
from 2007. The proportion of asset owners grew in absolute numbers over the years but 
remained at around 30 % of responses proportionately. This is consistent with the fact that 
investment managers should be more responsive to the business case argument given that they 
are the most performance oriented and are in charge of investing the assets, whereas asset 
owners manage a minority of their assets internally. 
Signatories see the value of the PRI in access to know-how, best practice, research, and trends 
in the responsible investment. They see the PRI as a learning tool for their organizations in the 
transition toward an ESG integrated investor, via webinars, discussions with other investors, 
implementation support, collaborative engagements, and the association’s research outputs. 
For instance, a French asset manager says: ‘The PRI provides an ambitious roadmap for 
continuous improvement with clear signposts and long term objectives. Our organization has 
managed, through its involvement in the past year, to move towards greater ESG integration 
more broadly (additional asset classes) and more deeply (from SRI to mainstream)’ (PRI survey 
responses 2011). A Brazilian investment manager describes the PRI as follows: ‘We have 
found a framework that accommodated our pre-signing beliefs related to ESG issues and value 
creation, and helped us organize or re-shape our internal analysis processes around the 
principles’ (PRI survey responses 2011). 
This finding is in line with much of the responsible investment literature that acknowledges the 
increasing realization among investors that SRI is a value-creating approach (Ctifo and Forget 
2012; Louche 2009) and that investors follow-up their investment beliefs with actions (Woods 
and Urwin 2010). It is also in line with Arjalies’ (2010) social movement perspective on the 
development of SRI, where institutions seek to incorporate a new emerging logic into their 
existing institutional logic to create a new mainstream hybrid. The structure and know-how 
provided to its signatories by the PRI helps investors with this process, therefore pragmatic 
legitimacy contributes to the salience of PRI’s claim. 
Management Values 
The salience of management values were strongly supported in the first 2 years of the PRI 
surveys, but support dropped dramatically in the subsequent years. In the years 2007, a 
staggering 90 % of asset owners and 60 % of asset managers explain their decision to sign the 
PRI by stating that the values of the PRI reflect the values of their organization, therefore, it is 
a natural step. In 2008, the asset owner number drops to 70 % while the asset manager number 
stays the same, but by 2009 evidence in both investors groups is only found in 10 % of 
responses. This number does not grow in the rest of the sample period. The groups of 
signatories that signed after year 2008 do not report on management values at all. It is the first 
signatories from 2006 to 2007 that drive the support for this attribute. 
A possible explanation of the great prominence of management values in the first years of 
PRI’s existence and why it was followed by its relative unimportance in the subsequent years 
is that the first wave of signatories would have been those investors who were already ESG 
minded. They made up most of the signatory body in the years 2007–2008, but by 2009 other 
factors such as the legitimacy of the PRI, utilitarian incentives, or pragmatic legitimacy 
attracted large numbers of mainstream investors who placed less emphasis on the alignment of 
values in their thinking about the benefits of signing the PRI. This is consistent with the social 
movement perspective on the evolution of responsible investment from activist and socially 
driven to profit driven (Markowitz et al. 2008). Other studies provide contrasting evidence, 
such as Jansson and Biel (2011) who find that institutional investors are not values driven as 
opposed to individual investors (McLachlan and Gardner 2004). It is, however, challenging to 
relate management values in the sense that they are manifested in the PRI-investor relationship 
to how they are understood elsewhere in the literature. The PRI principles convey little or 
arguably no moral values per se (Eccles 2010), while values-driven organizations as defined 
by Baron (2009) or Brickson (2007) take into account higher order values that are morally 
determined Figs. 2 and 3. 
Fig. 2 
Proportion of respondents whose responses indicated management values and pragmatic 
legitimacy as sources of salience in the process of signing the PRI, split into asset managers 
and investment managers 
Fig. 3 
Number of respondents by signature year whose responses supported the attribute of 
management values 
In summary, the attributes from the Mitchell et al. framework most supported by the data are 
normative and utilitarian power, and organizational and to a lesser extent societal legitimacy. 
Of Gifford’s additions to the framework, the attributes of management values and pragmatic 
legitimacy are the most prominent. The temporal aspect observed by Gifford is manifested 
clearly throughout the data in the variation over time in both the aggregate results and in results 
for investors grouped by signature year. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have argued that there is a set of attributes that make the PRI as a stakeholder 
and its claim to sign the six PRI salient to institutional investors. The dataset provides evidence 
of the stakeholder relationship between investors and the PRI as defined by Freeman (1984) 
and according to Mitchell et al.’s (1997) stakeholder identification framework. The PRI has 
the legitimacy, power, and management values attributes that contribute to stakeholder 
salience. Based on an examination of 5 years of predominantly confidential survey data from 
PRI signatories spanning the period from 2007 to 2011, we find that the attributes that 
contribute most to the salience of the PRI, and its claim are organizational and pragmatic 
legitimacy, utilitarian and normative power, and management values. There is a high degree of 
variability in time and across groups of signatories who joined in different years, consistent 
with the temporal effect observed by Gifford (2010), and the dynamic view of stakeholder 
relationships (Fassin 2010; Sachs and Maurer 2009; Windsor 2010). 
The strong presence of both utilitarian power and pragmatic legitimacy attributes in the 
responses indicates that an important source of salience for the claim to sign the PRI is the 
growing recognition of the materiality of ESG and its progressive mainstreaming reflected in 
demand for SRI (Louche 2009; Gifford 2010). This adds to the evidence already existing in the 
literature that investors see SRI as an avenue to value creation (Crifo and Forget 2013). 
Normative power and organizational legitimacy as sources of salience highlight that signatories 
consider signing the PRI to be a way of communicating a certain image to clients and other 
stakeholders, and that the PRI has succeeded in gaining a considerable level of organizational 
legitimacy over its first 5 years that investors recognize and want to benefit from by association 
(Mitchell et al. 1997; Eeasley and Lennox 2006). The prominence of normative power 
reinforces other findings such as that private equity funds adopt SRI strategies to differentiate 
themselves from competitors (Crifo and Forget 2013). 
The dominant presence of normative power provides interesting input for the literature on 
decoupling, which documents how organizations may decouple policy from practice in an 
effort to respond to stakeholder pressures (Crilly et al. 2012; Weaver et al. 1999). The dataset 
available to us gives us limited opportunity to make inferences about the practical 
implementation of the principles and the closing of the gap between SRI policy and practice 
(Haack et al. 2012), as we do not track individual organizations over time. However, our 
analysis does highlight this as an interesting question and hopefully encourages further research 
in this area. 
Management values are a unique attribute in that they appear to have been of major importance 
as a source of salience in the first 2 years in the sample, when the first wave of ethically and 
ESG-oriented investors signed up to the PRI. But they have been superseded by other factors 
in the later years when the values motivated signatory recruitment pool was largely exhausted 
and mainstream investors were drawn to the PRI in large numbers by its growing legitimacy 
and strong business case (Bromley and Powell 2012; Haack et al. 2012). Our findings support 
the proposition that the SRI movement transitions from socially driven toward profit oriented 
(Markowitz et al. 2008). Further research is required to more precisely define and measure the 
extent to which values play a role in the shift of institutional investment towards ESG 
integration. 
Societal legitimacy found weak evidence in the data. Attributes of coercive power, individual 
legitimacy, urgency, relative economic size of stakeholder, and coalition building find little or 
no support in signatory survey responses. 
This paper contributes to a better understanding of the stakeholder relationship between the 
PRI and investors. From the analysis, we gain an insight into how the sources of salience in 
this relationship are different from other contexts, in which the stakeholder salience model has 
been applied previously (Gifford 2010; Siltaoja and Lahdesmaki 2013; Hautbois et al. 2012; 
Parent and Deephouse 2007; Weber and Marley 2012). For instance, Parent and Deephouse 
(2007) find power to have the strongest influence on salience, followed by urgency and 
legitimacy. In the case of PRI signatories, legitimacy was more important than power, and 
urgency appeared to play no role at all. 
This paper also carries out a rare application of stakeholder theory to institutional investors as 
the organization managing its stakeholders, not as a stakeholder themselves, therefore 
extending stakeholder theory. It also sheds more light on the sources of salience of private 
regulatory initiatives in general, and of stakeholder claims as the primary unit of analysis. 
The findings have practical implications for both institutions operating in the responsible 
investment space and investors themselves. A key take away for investors is that the gap 
between the perception of responsible investment as a legitimate investment strategy by clients 
and by investors practicing it for sustainable value creation is closing, as illustrated by the 
simultaneous rise in both utilitarian and normative power. This should encourage and reassure 
existing and potential responsible investors of the growing legitimacy of this investment 
approach. Institutions with similar objectives and stakeholder relationships to the PRI can 
better understand how the sources of stakeholder salience shift over time and transition towards 
a more business case, normative and legitimacy-driven character. 
It is important to acknowledge the limitations of this research stemming both from the 
characteristics of the data and the method. 
The data is self-reported, which has a potential distorting effect on the type of answers 
submitted. Moreover, the answers analyzed in the sample were not mandatory, meaning that 
the sample was likely to represent the more involved among the PRI signatory base, who 
dedicated resources above the minimum that is required to avoid delisting. If that is the case, 
the results might be only a biased reflection of the motivations of the entire signatory body. It 
is however reassuring that the geographical distribution and investor type break down is not 
too dissimilar between the signatories who answered the question annually and those who did 
not, which limits the risk of response bias. However a clear limitation is that geographical 
variation is not studied in this research, although it is acknowledged in the literature that 
responsible investment differs geographically (Sakuma and Louche 2008; Sievanen et al. 2013; 
Sparkes 2002). Detailed descriptive statistics comparing the two groups year on year can be 
found in Appendix 2. 
The discretionary coding method is also a research limitation. It is hard to maintain consistency 
and lack of bias throughout the coding process for a human coder. The results are ultimately 
only one possible outcome of the analysis based on the interpretation of textual data by only 
one group of researchers. 
The above research limitations are routinely found in survey based research (Agle et al. 1999; 
Harris 2001; Hrashy 2011; Shin 2012; Valentine and Fleischman 2008). They are an obstacle 
to this type of study being precise and exactly representative of reality. Therefore the numbers 
quoted in the paper should be treated as a rough estimate of general trends among a sample of 
PRI signatories as reported by themselves, and as analyzed by a small team of researchers and 
not necessarily an accurate quantitative illustration of investor motivations. 
This study opens up several avenues for further research. The temporal dimension of 
stakeholder relationships which is supported by our findings raises many questions around the 
possible determinants and regularities that may be found in this dynamic. There is also ample 
opportunity for further research insight into the importance of particular attributes in the 
salience of private regulatory processes to particular stakeholders. We touch upon this topic by 
distinguishing between SRI and mainstream investors and public and private pension funds but 
there remains much more complexity to explore. 
Furthermore, the phenomena of conferring legitimacy (Long and Driscoll 2008; Perez-Batres 
et al. 2012) and decoupling of policy and practice (Boxenbaum and Jonsson 2008; Bromley 
and Powell 2012) that we highlighted in association with normative power may provide 
motivation for further studies in this area, as the concern regarding the true effectiveness of 
private regulatory processes in changing institutional behavior is widely shared among both 
practitioners and academics. 
The attributes that find no support in our data also raise further questions. One notable absence 
from the results is individual legitimacy, despite there being qualitative evidence that 
individuals do play a role in promoting ESG in an institutional setting (Lewis and Juravle 2009; 
Waddock 2011). Urgency was also not mentioned by signatories, continuing a trend of mixed 
results in the literature (Hautbois et al. 2012; Parent and Deephouse 2007; Neville et al. 2011; 
Weber and Marley 2012). The question of whether or not these attributes contribute to the 
salience of private regulatory processes invites further investigation from future research. 
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Appendix 1 
Attribute 
Conditions that answers coded as 
supporting each attribute must fulfill 
Examples of text coded as 
supporting each attribute 
Power 
normative 
Refers to benefit or motivation related to 
the perception of signing the PRI, 
reputational, branding or marketing 
benefits, joining the PRI as a license to 
operate. Refers to the value of signing the 
PRI as a way of sending a signal to clients 
and members that the organization takes 
its ESG capacity seriously 
‘The Principles provide a public 
recognition of our commitment to 
ESG research’ 
‘The main benefits in our opinion 
have to do with the image of 
excellence that the UN PRI 
signature gives’ 
Power 
utilitarian 
Refers to fulfilling the expectations of or 
gaining approval of existing or future 
clients, answering the rising demand on 
the market for RI 
‘We have been queried and 
reviewed by asset consultants and 
clients on our ESG activities’ 
‘As a number of our largest 
clients are also PRI signatories 
and so the greatest benefit has 
Attribute 
Conditions that answers coded as 
supporting each attribute must fulfill 
Examples of text coded as 
supporting each attribute 
been a clearer alignment of 
manager/client interests’ 
Power coercive 
Refers to legislation or formal coercive 
means by which stakeholders force 
organization to sign PRI 
n/a Hypothetical answer: ‘It is 
required by the stock exchange 
we are listed on’ 
Urgency-time 
sensitivity 
Refers to the temporal aspect of the 
benefit or motivation to sign the PRI, such 
as first-mover status, impeding event or 
deadline that is relevant 
n/a Hypothetical answer: ‘It 
helped us pre-empt the questions 
on our exploration of ESG issues 
that we expected at our upcoming 
AGM’ 
Urgency-
criticality 
Refers to the intensity with which 
stakeholders demand that the organization 
sign the PRI 
n/a Hypothetical answer: 
‘Signing the PRI came as a result 
of an intensive engagement with 
an NGO’ 
Legitimacy 
organizational 
Refers to the legitimacy of the PRI as an 
organization and/or therefore its ability to 
grant legitimacy to the signatory. Refers 
to signing the PRI as a license to operate 
‘We consider signing the UN PRI 
principles as a licence to operate’ 
‘Knowing we are supporting and 
engaging with a leading 
organization committed to the 
integration of sustainability and 
investment (…)’ 
Legitimacy 
individual 
Refers to the legitimacy of an individual 
that played a role In the decision to sign 
the PRI or has contributed to the benefits 
thereof 
n/a hypothetical answer: ‘Ban Ki-
Moon’s call for investors to sign 
the PRI convinced us to take the 
step’ 
Attribute 
Conditions that answers coded as 
supporting each attribute must fulfill 
Examples of text coded as 
supporting each attribute 
Legitimacy 
societal 
Refers to signing the PRI as an effort to be 
closer aligned with the interests and/or 
goals of society, or to better understand 
them 
‘ESG thinking helps our 
organization continuously in 
staying attuned with society’ 
‘This will enable all funds to 
enhance their investment 
decision-making for the benefit of 
members, and society in general, 
as the industry realises its ability 
to make an impact on some major 
global issues’ 
Relative 
economic size 
Refers to the size of the PRI as a 
motivating factor in signing the PRI as a 
trend, a snowball effect 
n/a hypothetical answer: ‘The 
size of the AUM represented by 
PRI signatories convinced us that 
we should sign also’ 
Coalition 
building 
Refers to the PRI creating collaborations 
with other stakeholders being a factor in 
the investor’s decision to sign 
‘It also allows us to make 
reference to the UN while 
communicating on our 
responsible investment practices 
(…)’ 
Management 
values 
Refers to the values of the organization 
being aligned with the values of the PRI 
‘Alignment with others who share 
the same values’ 
‘The goals of the PRI are very 
much aligned with those of our 
organization’ 
Pragmatic 
legitimacy 
Refers to the PRI being a useful 
framework for and source of information 
on and support in integrating ESG into 
‘UNRPI reporting and 
assessment tool provides 
Attribute 
Conditions that answers coded as 
supporting each attribute must fulfill 
Examples of text coded as 
supporting each attribute 
investment, and the opportunities that 
ESG creates 
guidance on best practice for 
reporting on our SRI activities’ 
‘UNPRI newsfeed is considered 
very useful by the team’ 
‘A deeper understanding of ESG 
issues and the link to investment 
performance’ 
Appendix 2 
Region/year 
2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 
R NR R NR R NR R NR R NR 
North America 18 19 18 28 18 17 14 24 15 43 
Asia 3 10 5 7 7 10 7 0 7 0 
Europe 50 50 46 35 46 34 52 29 47 29 
Africa 5 1 5 0 5 2 3 6 1 0 
Latin America 5 6 6 6 5 20 5 23 15 14 
Oceania 19 14 20 24 19 17 19 18 15 14 
Totals 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
R percentage of respondents to question analyzed in given year headquartered in given region, 
NR percentage of non-respondents to question analyzed in given year headquartered in given 
region 
  2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 
Region/year 
2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 
R NR R NR R NR R NR R NR 
R 
(%) 
NR 
(%) 
R 
(%) 
NR 
(%) 
R 
(%) 
NR 
(%) 
R 
(%) 
NR 
(%) 
R 
(%) NR (%) 
Investment manager 63 65 62 51 57 44 50 53 44 13 
Asset owner 37 35 38 49 43 56 50 47 56 88 
Totals 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 101 
R percentage of respondents to question analyzed in given year belonging to each investor 
type, NR percentage of non-respondents to question analyzed in given year belonging to each 
investor type 
Appendix 3 
Use of manual content analysis 
Some of the following studies in particular establish a precedent for the choice of content 
analysis for coding self-reported textual data. In 1990, Jarvenpaa and Ives used it to analyze 
649 letters to shareholders in annual reports to find out about the importance of IT to corporate 
strategy (Jarvenpaa and Ives 1990). Bravo et al. (2012) analyze self-declared CSR activities of 
Spanish banking institutions. Further, Meyer and Hollerer (2014) analyze the impact of framing 
contested issues in public discourse on shareholder value in Austria. 
The motivation for using content analysis in this particular paper is explained most accurately 
by the researchers’ objective of using the method most effective in extracting maximum 
structured information from unstructured textual data. 
Among the most prominent advantages of manual coding for content analysis is that the human 
coders brings in their experience and expertise into the coding process. Each of the authors of 
this paper has had experience of working in the PRI space and interacting with signatories, 
which helps interpret data correctly. Humans generally excel at analyzing unstructured text. It 
is for that reason that Deffner (1985) argues that computerized coding lacks validity by 
comparison, although it is effective as a method to maximize reliability. Following an 
experiment comparing automated and manual content analysis, Morris (1993) concludes that 
both methods can be equally effective. The fact that responsible investment still operates with 
an emergent vocabulary (Sandberg et al. 2009) makes the choice of manual content analysis a 
particularly suitable one since as it has been observed in previous academic literature, 
computerized content analysis takes away the complexity and context from language 
(Pennebaker and Lay 2002; Bligh et al. 2004b) preventing higher level insights into the material 
(Bligh et al. 2004a). 
Moreover, as a methodology, content analysis is neither an unambiguously qualitative or 
quantitative method (Harwood and Garry 2003; Insch et al. 1997; Burnett et al. 1991). It can 
be described as qualitative in the first stage where the text is analyzed and the content divided 
into categories; quantitative when applied to quantifying the occurrence and relative 
importance of the categories or phenomena. This combination of qualitative and quantitative 
characteristics in content analysis allows us to present the data in a structured manner, and 
therefore communicate the findings more clearly. 
The limitations are as follows. Manual coding is not very transparent, as opposed to automated 
coding following simple phrase or keyword identification processes; nor is it as consistent, 
because of fatigue, varying focus, and attention during the process and possible personal bias 
(Boritz et al. 2012; Morris 1993). A limitation that applies to management and finance research 
is that there is so far no specialized coding system (such as the Gottschalk-Gleser (1969) 
method in psychology). This limits the cross-comparability between different studies (Morris 
1993). 
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